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S.
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ALEXANDRA HARRINGTON*

This article reviews significant legal developments during 2017 in
international art and cultural heritage law in the areas of foreign sovereign
immunity and stolen art, looted antiquities, Holocaust restitution, and
reparations for destruction of cultural and religious sites.
I. Foreign Sovereign Immunity And Stolen Art: Williams V.
Nat'l Gallery Of Art
The heirs of Margaret (Greta) Moll sued Great Britain, the National
Gallery, London, and the American Friends of the National Gallery,
London, Inc. (the Defendants) in an effort to recover a painting by Henri
Matisse entitled Portraitof Greta Mol (the Painting). Focusing largely on
foreign sovereign immunity, the court dismissed the lawsuit.'
A.

BACKGROUND

In 1908, Oskar Moll purchased a portrait of his wife, Greta, from Henri
Matisse, from whom he had commissioned the work.2 The Molls lived in
Berlin when World War II began; they and the Painting survived the war. 3
In 1946, given the turmoil of post-war Berlin, the Molls decided to move to
Wales, and, to protect the Painting from looting, they decided to send the
Painting to Switzerland to be held by an art dealer. 4 Oskar's former student
offered to take the Painting to Switzerland, and, in 1947, after Oskar's death,
the student took the Painting, ostensibly to deliver it to the Swiss dealer. 5
But she illegally converted the Painting and kept the proceeds, later
* Kathleen Nandan is an attorney with extensive experience in federal money laundering
and asset forfeiture and has worked on a number matters involving seizures of art and cultural
property (Part I). David Bright is an attorney with Simmons Perrine Moyer Bergman PLC, and
Co-Chair of the International Art & Cultural Heritage Law Committee (Part II). Haley S.
Anderson is Development Editor, Oxford University Press. J.D., New York University School
of Law (2014) (Part III). Dr. Alexandra R. Harrington is Lead Counsel for Peace, Justice &
Accountability at the Centre for International Sustainable Development Law, Adjunct Professor
at Albany Law School and Director of Studies for ILA Colombia (Part IV).
1. Williams v. Nat'l Gallery of Art, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154445 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21,

2017).
2. Id.at *2-3.
3. Id.
4.Id.
5.Id.
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confessing to Greta that she used the Painting to secure a loan from the art
dealer.6 Greta ultimately "lost track of the Painting."7
A New York art gallery acquired the Painting in 1949.8 Thereafter, the
Painting was transferred a number of times and, in 1979, two years before
Greta died, the National Gallery-a public entity wholly owned by Great
Britain-acquired the Painting.9 One of the heirs' ancestors learned that the
National Gallery held the Painting in the late 1970s or early 1980s. 10
Another ancestor appeared in a photograph next to the painting in a 1992
news article."
At some time after 1979, the heirs "informed the National Gallery that
the Painting had been stolen from" Ms. Moll. In March 2011, the heirs'
counsel and the National Gallery began to exchange correspondence about
the Painting's provenance, and the heirs advised the National Gallery that it
lacked good title to the Painting. In November 2012, the National Gallery
sent the heirs a letter rejecting their claims, asserting that the gallery had
good title and that it "had conducted reasonable due diligence when it"
acquired the Painting.12
In 2014, the heirs filed a request for return of the Painting with the British
Spoliation Advisory Panel (SAP), a body that resolves Holocaust era art
claims. A year later, SAP declined to adjudicate the request, noting that it
lacked jurisdiction; the painting was lost in 1947, and SAP's jurisdiction was
limited to the Nazi era, that ended in 1945. Thereafter, the heirs demanded
the painting's return from the National Gallery, and several months later,
the National Gallery notified the heirs' counsel that it would not return the
Painting. The next year, in September 2016, the heirs filed suit in federal
district court in the Southern District of New York alleging conversion,
replevin, constructive trust, unjust enrichment, and seeking declaratory
relief. The Defendants-Great Britain, the National Gallery, and American
Friends (a U.S.-based non-profit that operates for the benefit of the
National Gallery and that the heirs alleged was the Gallery's alter ego)moved to dismiss. The court granted those motions, finding that the heirs'
claims were barred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).3 The
Court also found the claims barred by the statute of limitations and the
4
doctrine of laches.'

6. Williams, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154445, at *37.
7. Id. at *3.
8. Id.
9.Id.
10. Id.
at *35.
11. Williams, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154445, at *37.
12. Id. at *28-37. (For the foregoing paragraph).
13. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1330, et seq. (the FSIA).
14. Williams, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154445, at *4-5, 28. (For the foregoing paragraph).
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THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT

The FSIA "provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign
state," including its agencies and instrumentalities, such as the National
Gallery.s The FSIA generally confers immunity from U.S. jurisdiction
upon foreign states, but it also provides for a number of exceptions to this
general rule.16 The heirs argued that three exceptions to foreign sovereign
immunity applied to this case: (1) the expropriation exception; (2) the
commercial activity exception; and (3) the waiver exception.'7 The court
rejected each of these arguments.
The expropriation exception to foreign sovereign immunity limits
immunity in cases involving "property taken in violation of international
law." For the exception to apply, a plaintiff must show that: (1) rights in
property are at issue; (2) property was taken; (3) the taking was in violation
of international law; and either (4)(a) the property is in the United States in
connection with commercial activity being undertaken by the foreign state;
or (4)(b) the property is owned or operated by the foreign state's agency or
instrumentality that is engaged in commercial activity in the United States.' 9
Because Oskar Moll's former student had originally stolen the painting, and
"[b]ecause conversion by a private individual is not an FSIA taking," the
heirs argued that the National Gallery's 2015 refusal to return the painting
constituted an unlawful taking.20 The court was not persuaded. It observed
that the act of taking property is very different from the act of refusing to
return property and that to hold otherwise would be to "drastically broaden"
the "carefully crafted expropriation exception" and undermine
Congressional intent to minimize interference in foreign relations related to
litigation in U.S. courts.2' As such, the court concluded that the
expropriation exception did not apply.
The commercial activity exception limits immunity in cases based upon
commercial activity undertaken by the foreign state. 22 Under this exception,
a foreign sovereign does not enjoy immunity from U.S. jurisdiction when
the "action is based upon": (1) a commercial activity undertaken in the
United States by the foreign state; (2) an act performed in the United States
in connection with the foreign state's commercial activity conducted
elsewhere; or (3) an act outside of the United States taken in connection
with a foreign state's commercial activity that "causes a direct effect in the
15. Id. at *5. (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443

(1989)).
16. Id. at *5-6.
17. Id.

18.
19.
F.3d
20.
21.
22.

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
Williams, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154445, at *7 (citing Garb v. Republic of Poland, 440
579, 588 (2d Cir. 2006)).
Id. at *9.
Id. at *10, 12.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
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United States."23 To satisfy the elements of this exception, an action must be
"based upon the particular conduct that constitutes the gravamen of the
suit," and the court "must identify the act of the foreign sovereign state that
serves as the basis for plaintiffs' claims."24 Here, the heirs alleged that they
satisfied the exception because the National Gallery: (1) conducted
commercial activities in the United States (including the incorporation of
American Friends): (2) published images of the Painting in the United States
and loaned the Painting to a New York museum; and (3) sent its letter
refusing return of the Painting to counsel in New York.25 The court rejected
these arguments because it found that none of these activities were "core to
the suit" nor bore upon "the core issue in this case: do Plaintiffs have
superior title to the Painting."26
The waiver exception limits immunity in cases where the foreign state has
waived its immunity.:7 The heirs argued that, because Great Britain is a
signatory to the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property,28 Great Britain and the National Gallery had waived sovereign
immunity.29 But because waivers must be "clear, complete, unambiguous,
and unmistakable," because implicit waivers "must be construed narrowly,"
and because nothing in the 1970 Convention suggested that its signatories
intended to subject themselves to foreign jurisdictions, the court concluded
that the waiver exception did not apply.30 The court therefore granted Great
Britain's and the National Gallery's motions to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.
C.

TMELINESS

After concluding that it lacked jurisdiction under the FSIA to hear the
heirs' claims, the court also held that the heirs' claims against all of the
Defendants were time-barred under both the statute of limitations and
31
under the doctrine of laches.
23. Williams, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154445, at *17 (citing Garb, 440 F.3d at 586, and quoting
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)).
24. Id. at *17, 18 (quoting Atlantica Holdings, Inc. v. Sovereign Wealth Fund Samruk-Kazyna
JSC, 813 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2016)).
25. Id. at *19-20.
26. Id. at *21. The court also found the third argument unpersuasive in that it would allow the
heirs to manufacture jurisdiction simply by corresponding with the foreign state.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
28. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 10 I.L.M. 289.
(the 1970 Convention).
29. Williams, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154445, at *23-24.
30. Id. at *24-25. (quoting Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 50, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Drexel
Burnham Lambert Grp. Inc. v. Comm. of Receivers for Galadari, 12 F.3d 317, 325 (2d Cir.
1993)).
31. Id. at *26-27.
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Under New York law, a three-year statute of limitations governs actions to
recover chattel or damages for the taking of chattel. Those actions accrue
against a good faith purchaser once the true owner makes a demand for the
chattel's return and the demand is refused. Claims against a bad faith
possessor accrue immediately.32 Assuming that the gallery was a good faith
purchaser, the court held that the heirs' claims accrued upon receipt of the
gallery's November 2012 letter refusing to return the Painting. The court
rejected the heirs' argument that this letter was ambiguous and was not a
final determination and that it therefore should look to the 2015 refusal
instead. 33 As such, the court found the heirs' claims were untimely.
The court also found that the doctrine of laches, an equitable defense
grounded in unreasonable delay in prosecuting a claim and resulting
prejudice to the defendant, barred Plaintiffs' claims insofar as the heirs and
their ancestors had known for decades that the National Gallery held the
34
Painting but took no steps to recover it until 2011.
II.

Forfeiture of Looted Antiquities: Hobby Lobby

In July 2017, Hobby Lobby entered into a settlement with the U.S.
Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York for violating federal
law prohibiting the importation of falsely identified cultural property. 35 In
addition to the fine, Hobby Lobby also agreed to forfeit thousands of
ancient cuneiform tablets and clay bullae (clay balls with imprinted seals)
originating in the region that is now Iraq.36 This matter had originated with
the United States of America filing a Verified Complaint In Rem Against
Approximately Four Hundred Fifty (450) Ancient Cuneiform Tablets and
7
Approximately Three Thousand (3,000) Ancient Clay Bullae (Complaint).3
Specifically, the Complaint was brought to condemn and forfeit the
defendants to the use and benefit of the United States pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
1595a(c)(1)(A), as merchandise that was introduced or attempted to be
introduced into the United States contrary to law. 38 Section 1595a(c)(1)(A)
32. Id. at *26-27 (citing N.Y CLRP Law § 124(3) (Consol. 2018)).
33. Id. at *27-34.
34. Id. at *35-37 (in the context of stolen artwork, an examination of a plaintiff's diligence
"focuses not only on efforts by the party to the action, but also on efforts by the party's
family")(citing Bakalarv. Vavra, 819 F. Supp. 2d 292, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), affd 500 F. App'x 6
(2d Cir. 2012). Bakalar has been discussed in previous editions of this publication. See Patty
Gerstenblith, David Bright, Jacqueline Farinella, Michael McCollough, & Kathleen Nandan,
InternationalArtand CulturalHeritage, 47 INT'L LAW. 423, 431 (2013); David Bright, Jacqueline
Farinella, Patty Gerstenblith & Laina Lopez, InternationalArt and Cultural Heritage, 46 INT'L
LAw. 405, 415-17 (2012); and Patty Gerstenblith, InternationalArt and Cultural Heritage, 45
INT'L LAW. 395, 403 -04 (2011).
35. Stipulation of Settlement, United States of America v. Approximately Four Hundred Fifty
(450) Ancient Cuneiform Tablets Et Al, No. 1:17-cv-3980-LDH (E.D.N.Y Jul. 5, 2017).
36. Id.
37. Complaint, United States v. Approximately Four Hundred Fifty (450) Ancient Cuneiform
Tablets Et Al, No. 1:17-cv-3980 (E.D.N.Y. July. 5, 2017).
38. Id. para. 1.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

Published by SMU Scholar, 2018

5

The Year in Review, Vol. 52, No. 1 [2018], Art. 29

THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
426

THE YEAR IN REVIEW

[VOL. 52

provides that merchandise that is introduced or attempted to be introduced
into the United States contrary to law shall be seized and forfeited if it is
stolen, smuggled, or clandestinely imported or introduced. 39 Merchandise is
deemed smuggled or clandestinely imported or introduced if it was imported
contrary to 18 U.S.C. sections 542 or 545.40
The Complaint alleged that beginning in or about 2009, Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc. (Hobby Lobby) "began to assemble a collection of historically
important manuscripts, antiquities and other cultural materials (the
Collection)."41 The president of Hobby Lobby (President) approved these
purchases and was advised by a consultant retained by Hobby Lobby
(Consultant).42
Around July 15, 2010, the President and Consultant inspected a large
number of items offered for sale (Artifacts) in the United Arab Emirates
(UAE).43 About two weeks later, Hobby Lobby's in-house counsel (InHouse Counsel) contacted an expert in cultural property law (Expert) to
request a presentation to Hobby Lobby.44 "The Expert offered to address
the legal issues relevant to the acquisition of historical works and antiquities,
actions to take in carrying out due diligence and provenance research, and
the particular legal issues pertaining to cultural property."45
In early August 2010, the Expert made a presentation at Hobby Lobby's
headquarters.46 In mid-October 2010, the Expert then provided Hobby
Lobby with a memo summarizing the Expert's advice, including with respect
to Iraqi cultural property. 47 That memo was received by In-House Counsel
but was not shared with anyone else at Hobby Lobby involved in the
investigation of the Artifacts.48
Approximately two months later, the President signed a purchase
agreement for the sale of the Artifacts to Hobby Lobby.49 In 2010 and 2011,
Hobby Lobby tasked its International Department with facilitating the
importation and customs clearance of merchandise it purchased, but that
department was bypassed during the purchase of the Artifacts. s0
Around November 23, 2010, the Artifacts were shipped to Hobby Lobby,
with misleading labels, and to various other addresses that were associated
39. Id. para. 8.
40. Id. para. 19.
41. Complaint, Approximately FourHundred Fifty (450) Ancient Cuneiform Tablets, No. 1:17-cv3980 para. 20.
42. Id. para. 22.
43. Id.
44. Id. para. 23.
45. Id. para. 26.
46. Complaint, Approximately FourHundred Fifty (450) Ancient Cuneiform Tablets, No. 1:17-cv3980 para. 27.
47. Id. para. 31.
48. Id. at 33.
49. Id. para. 34-36.
50. Id. para. 41.
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with Hobby Lobby. 51 Additional shipments occurred on December 19 and
20, 2010; and September 1, 2011.52 Between December 26, 2010, and
January 5, 2011, three shipments of pieces were delivered to Hobby Lobby
via Federal Express (FedEx).53 On or about January 19, 2011, U.S. Customs
54
and Border Protection (Customs) seized five FedEx shipments of pieces.
In March of 2011, Customs sent notices of the seizure to Hobby Lobby's
President and Executive Assistant.55 On or about May 16, 2011, Hobby
Lobby filed an administrative petition with Customs seeking return of the
seized pieces (the Pieces), 56 and in September of 2011, Hobby Lobby
submitted a supplemental administrative petition to Customs.5 7 On or about
July 8, 2015, Customs sent amended notices of the Pieces to counsel for
Hobby Lobby.58 Counsel for Hobby Lobby subsequently responded to the
amended notices by requesting referral of the Pieces to the United States
Attorney's Office for the commencement of judicial forfeiture proceedings.59
The parties subsequently entered into a series of tolling agreements, and the
statute of limitations tolled from September 30, 2015 through June 2,
2017.60

On July 5, 2017, the parties filed a proposed executed Stipulation of
Settlement with the Court.61 On July 21, 2017, a signed Warrant for Arrest
of Articles In Rem was filed with the Court.62 On July 21, 2017, the parties
filed a revised executed Stipulation of Settlement (the Stipulation).63
In the Stipulation, Hobby Lobby consented to the seizure and forfeiture
of the $3,000,000.00 and 144 cylinder seals to the United States (the
Forfeited Assets).64 Hobby Lobby waived any and all rights to the Pieces
and the Forfeited Assets, and agreed "not to file a claim or petition the
United States or any of its agencies for remission or mitigation of the
forfeiture of the Defendants in rem or the Forfeited Assets."65 It waived its
rights to assert any statutory or constitutional defense related to the Pieces
51. Id. para. 42.
52. Complaint, Approximately FourHundred Fifty (450) Ancient Cuneiform Tablets, No. 1:17-cv3980 para. 43.
53. Id. para. 44.
54. Id. para. 45.
55. Id. para. 46.
56. Id. para. 47.
57. Complaint, Approximately FourHundred Fifty (450) Ancient Cuneiform Tablets, No. 1:17-cv3980 para. 48.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Stipulation of Settlement, United States of America v. Approximately Four Hundred Fifty
(450) Ancient Cuneiform Tablets Et Al, No. 1:17-cv-3980-LDH (E.D.N.Y Jul. 5, 2017).
62. Warrant for Arrest, United States v. Approximately Four Hundred Fifty (450) Ancient
Cuneiform Tablets Et Al, 1:17-cv-03980-LDH (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 21, 2017).
63. Stipulation of Settlement, United States of America v. Approximately Four Hundred Fifty
(450) Ancient Cuneiform Tablets Et Al, No. 1:17-cv-3980-LDH (E.D.N.Y Jul. 5, 2017).
64. Id. para. 11.
65. Id. para. 12.
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or the Forfeited Assets.66 Further, Hobby Lobby released its claims, rights,
7
title, and interest in the Pieces and Forfeited Assets.6
Additionally, Hobby Lobby agreed to fully assist the United States in
effectuating the forfeiture of the Forfeited Assets, including payment of the
$3,000,000.00 and "executing any documents necessary to effectuate the
transfer of title to the Forfeited Assets to the United States."68 It waived the
filing of a civil forfeiture complaint in accordance with 18 U.S.C. section
983, any notice requirements pursuant to Rule G or otherwise, and any
69
defenses to judicial or administrative forfeiture of the Forfeited Assets.
The Stipulation provided that the United States will publish notice of the
Defendants in rem and the Forfeited Assets and its intent to forfeit them on
the government's official website.70 The Stipulation further provided that
upon the issuance of the decree of forfeiture, "the Department of Justice,
United States Department of Homeland Security, and their duly authorized
agents and/or contractors shall be authorized to dispose of the Defendants in
rem and Forfeited Assets in accordance with all laws and regulations."71
The Stipulation included several additional actions by Hobby Lobby.
First, Hobby Lobby represented "that it had adopted internal policies and
procedures for the importation and purchase of cultural property."72
Additionally, Hobby Lobby agreed to "not sell, gift, assign, or otherwise
transfer cultural property to another individual or institution unless such
transfer [was] done in compliance with either" the Association of Art
Museum Directors (AAMD) Guidelines on the Acquisition of
Archaeological Material and Ancient Art or the AAMD Protocols for Safe
73
Havens for Works of Cultural Significance from Countries in Crisis.
Second, Hobby Lobby agreed that personnel who are identified in its
policies as responsible for dealing with cultural property will be trained no
less frequently than annually on customs, provenance, and due diligence
regarding cultural property importation by qualified customs counsel,r4 and
agreed "to engage a qualified customs broker to provide customs brokerage
services for all importations of Cultural Property."75
Third, Hobby Lobby agreed to provide quarterly reports to the United
States Attorney's Office regarding all cultural property acquired and/or
imported by it, any changes to its cultural property policies, and dates and
66. Id.
67. Id. para. 13.

68. Id. para. 15.
69. Stipulation of Settlement, Approximately Four Hundred Fifty (450) Ancient Cuneiform
Tablets, 1:17-cv-3980-LDH para. 17.

70. Id. para. 22.
71. Id. para. 24.
72. Id. para. 27.
73. Id.
74. Id. para. 28.
75. Stipulation of Settlement, Approximately Four Hundred Fifty (450) Ancient Cuneiform
Tablets, 1:17-cv-3980-LDH para. 30.
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subjects of any training during that quarter.76 It will notify the United States
Attorney's office of any failure to comply with the regulations and laws
concerning cultural property or that any third party has provided it with any
materially false information regarding the provenance or ownership history
of any cultural property it imported.77 Hobby Lobby agreed to be penalized
$2,000 per day for each day it fails to implement and maintain compliance
measures, cause delivery of any quarterly report, or timely deliver notice of
failure to comply or receipt of false information.78

III. Resuscitating a Holocaust Restitution Claim: Cassirer v.
Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection
In July 2 017, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit resuscitated
one of the longest-running Holocaust restitution cases in the U.S. federal
courts. 79 The decision concerns a stolen Pissarro painting and provides
insight in applying foreign law and new U.S. legislation in such claims.
Lilly Cassirer, daughter-in-law of Jewish industrialist and art gallery
owner Julius Cassirer, fled Germany in 1939.80 At that time, the
"Aryanization" process by which German Jews were deprived of all property
rights was well underway.81 To receive an exit visa, Lilly82 was forced to
exchange a painting her father-in-law had acquired shortly after its
completion three decades earlier, Camille Pissarro's Rue Saint-Honore, aprsmidi, effet de pluie (the Painting). She was paid a paltry sum of "$360 in
Reichsmarks. "83
After the war, Lilly returned to Germany and filed a claim through an
Allied-established process for restoring expropriated property. The U.S.
Court of Restitution Appeals (CORA) declared in a published opinion that
Lilly owned the Painting.84
The German Federal Republic later established a legal process whereby
Lilly initiated a compensation claim against the state for the Painting's
wrongful taking. At the time, all parties involved believed the Painting was
lost. Following this process, the parties entered into a settlement in 1958
that provided, inter alia, that Germany would pay Lilly the Painting's recent
agreed value.85
76. Id. para. 31-32.

77. Id. para. 33.
78. Id. para. 35.
79. Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 862 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2017).
80. See BRUCE L. HAY, NAzi-LoOTED ART AND THE LAW 137 (2017).
81. See Constantin Goschler & Philipp Ther, Introduction to ROBBERY AND RESTITUTION:
THE CONFLICT OVER JEWISH PROPERTY IN EUROPE 3, 4 (Martin Dean et al., eds., 2007).
82. See Thyssen-Bornemisza III, 862 F.3d at 955 n.1 (The Ninth Circuit refers to Lilly Cassirer,
Lilly Neubauer after remarriage, simply as "Lilly.")
83. Id. at 955.
84. Id. at 956.
85. Id. (For the foregoing paragraph).
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Meanwhile, the Painting sat in an American private collection having
made its way there through an anonymous Berlin auction and a Beverly Hills
gallery. Then, in 1976, the Baron Thyssen-Bornemisza (the Baron)
purchased the painting through a New York gallery for $275,000,
approximately half of what would have been expected from a dealer sale.
The Baron moved the Painting to Switzerland, where it became part of his
collection until 1992.86
In 1988, the Baron agreed to loan his collection to Spain. As part of the
agreement, Spain created a foundation, "TBC," to manage the collection,
and restored a Madrid palace to house it. When restoration ended in 1992,
the Baron moved his collection to Spain. The following year, the Baron sold
7
the collection to TBC for $350 million, despite its $1-$2 billion value.8
In 2000 Lilly's grandson, Claude, learned of the Painting's fate. In May
2001, the Cassirer family filed an unsuccessful petition for restitution in
Spanish court. Claude then filed another action for restitution in California
district court in 2005.88
After a decade of litigation, during which, the case reached the Ninth
Circuit multiple times,89 the district court dismissed the Cassirers' claims.
The district court granted TBC's motion for summary judgment,
determining that TBC was the rightful owner of the Painting and the
Cassirers' claims were time-barred.90 Both parties appealed the judgment.91
While the appeals were pending, Congress passed the Holocaust
Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 (HEAR).92 Specifically targeting
such cases, HEAR directs federal courts to apply a six-year statute of
limitations running from the date of the claimant's actual discovery of the
artwork to any covered claims pending as of HEAR's enactment. 93 This
decision became the first application of HEAR's statute of limitations by a
circuit court. The court found that because the Cassirers "acquired actual
knowledge of the Painting's location in 2000" and filed this lawsuit in 2005,
4
the Cassirers' claims were timely under HEAR.9
Because its subject-matter jurisdiction is based on the FSIA,95 the Ninth
Circuit followed the Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws to
86. Id. at 956-57. (For the foregoing paragraph).
87. Id. (For the foregoing paragraph).
88. Thyssen-Bornemisza Ill, 862 F.3d at 956-57. (For the foregoing paragraph).
89. Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010) (One of these
concerned the court's jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit found subject-matter jurisdiction based
on the "expropriation" exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(3)).
90. Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
91. Thyssen-Bornemisza III, 862 F.3d at 958.
92. Id. at 960; Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act, Pub L. No. 114-308, § 4 5,
130 Stat. 1525 (2016).
93. Thyssen-Bornemisza III, 862 F.3d at 960 (citing HEAR § 5(d)(1)).
94. Id.
95. Id. 961 ("[V]hen jurisdiction is based on the FSIA, 'federal common law applies to the
choice of law rule determination. Federal common law follows the approach of the
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determine Spanish law governs the parties' claims.96 The Ninth Circuit held
that Spain's law applies because it has the most significant relationship to the
case. First, the Painting is situated in Spain, that gives Spain "the dominant
interest in determining the circumstances under which an interest in the
chattel [may transfer] by adverse possession or by prescription."97 Second,
the Restatement's § 6 factors, on balance, favor Spain.98
The core question of the case then became: Has TBC acquired good title
to the Painting? If so, TBC is entitled to summary judgment denying the
Cassirers' claims.
The court noted that the Spanish Civil Code's article 1955 states:
"Ownership of movable property prescribes by three years of uninterrupted
possession in good faith. Ownership of moveable property also prescribes by
six years of uninterrupted possession without any other condition."99 Article
1941 defines "possession" as being "in the capacity of the owner,

. .

. public,

peaceful, and uninterrupted." 100
The court found two triable issues of fact regarding TBC's title.
Proceeding chronologically, the first is: Did the Baron acquire the Painting
in good faith? "[Ifthe Baron had good title to the Paintingwhen he sold it to
TBC, then TBC became the lawful owner of the Painting through the
acquisition agreement." 10 Following Spanish choice-of-law rules, the court
noted that Swiss acquisitive prescription governs the Baron's acquisition of
title. Accordingly, whether the Baron meets the good faith requirement of
Swiss acquisitive prescription is a triable issue of fact.102
While providing no explicit direction, the Ninth Circuit implied
skepticism. The opinion lists many suspicious factors and repeatedly quotes
the Cassirers' expert, referring to TBC's only in a footnote.03 Among these
factors are: the low price the Baron paid; that many Pissarro paintings
succumbed to Nazi looting, demonstrated by Pissarro restitution cases 04; a
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws."' (quoting Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A.
de C.V., 930 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1991)).
96. Id. at 961-963.
97. Id. at 963 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 246, cmt. a (Am.
LAW INST.

1986)).

98. Id. 962-964.
99. Thyssen-Bornemisza III, 862 F.3d at 965 (quoting Spanish Civil Code [C.C.] art. 1955
(Spain).
100. Id. at 965 (quoting Spanish Civil Code [C.C.] art. 1941 (Spain).
101. Id. at 974.
102. Id. at 975-976.
103. Compare the discussion of Dr. Petropulos's "red flags", id. at 49-50, with the footnote
mention of Dr. Ernst, id. at 49 n.28.
104. See, e.g., Annalisa Quinn, French Court Orders Return of PissarroLooted by Vichy Government,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/08/arts/design/french-court-

pissarro-looted-nazis.html; Looted Paintings Found in Nazi Dealer's Safe,

SPIEGEL ONLINE (June

6, 2007, 01:11 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/stolen-works-of-art-discov
ered-in-swiss-bank-looted-paintings-found-in-nazi-dealer-s-safe-a-486999.html.
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torn label from a Berlin gallery on the Painting; and the availability of
information about CORA cases. 105
The second triable issue of fact is whether TBC knew the Painting was
stolen. If the Baron did not acquire the Painting in good faith, then under
Spanish law TBC could only have acquired good title through acquisitive
prescription. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that TBC
meets article 1955's requirements: TBC has possessed the Painting as an
owner for more than six years, and during the relevant period its possession
was public, peaceful, and uninterrupted. But the Ninth Circuit disagreed
with the district court's interpretation of another provision of the Spanish
Civil Code: article 1956.106 This article extends the time of possession
required for acquisitive prescription (1) where the relevant property was
"robbed or stolen from the rightful owner (2) as to the principals,
7
accomplices or accessories after the fact ('encubridores')."10
Finding no dispute that the Painting was stolen from its rightful owner,
this portion of the Ninth Circuit's opinion hinges on the legal definition of
"encubridor" and particularly whether the term includes one who "knowingly
benefits himself from stolen property." The parties presented conflicting
definitions of "encubridor" provided in different versions of the Spanish Penal
Code. The Cassirers argued that article 1956, enacted in and unmodified
since 1889, should be interpreted according to the contemporaneous 1870
Penal Code. The 1870 Penal Code included persons knowingly benefitting
themselves from stolen property in the "encubridor" definition. TBC noted
the 1870 Penal Code was modified in 1950 and argued that "encubridor"
should be defined according to the Penal Code in force when TBC acquired
the Painting. In the later Penal Code, TBC argued, one could only be an
"encubridor" if,
after a crime took place, one "acted in some manner to aid
'
those who committed the crime avoid penalties or prosecutions."108
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit sided with the Cassirers. As a preliminary
matter, the court determined that Spanish rules of statutory interpretation
apply and instruct courts to construe rules according to 1) the "proper
meaning of their wording," 2) their context, 3) their historical and legislative
background, and 4) social reality at the time of application.109 Finding the
first and second factors inconclusive, the court determined that the historical
and legislative background mitigates in favor of the 1870 definition.110 First,
Spanish rules of statutory interpretation indicate that a statute's "'historical
and legislative background' refers to the history that occurred before Article
1956 was enacted.""' Second, two judges found that the 1950 amendment
105. Thyssen-Bornemisza III, 862 F.3d at 976.
106. Id. at 966.
107. Id. at 967.

108. Id. at 960-67. (For the foregoing paragraph).
109. Id. at 968-69.
110. Id.
111. Thyssen-Bornemis'za IfI, 862 F.3d at 968-69.
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to the 1870 Penal Code did not change the definition of "encubridor."112
Consequently, neither the later Penal Code nor the social reality in the early
1990s would indicate that article 1956 required something more than
3
knowingly benefitting oneself from stolen property."
IV. Reparations for Cultural Heritage Crimes: The Prosecutor
v. Ahmad A] Faqi AI-Mahdi
In September 2016, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued the
verdict in The Prosecutorv. Abmad Al FaqiAI-Mabdi, the first case in that the
ICC examined the issue of culpability for the destruction of cultural heritage
as a war crime." 4 AI-Mabdi involved the destruction of ten cultural and
religious sites, including mosques and burial sites, that were essential to the
local population in Timbuktu and had been designated as UNESCO World
Heritage sites."1 In this case, Ai-Mahdi had been one of the leaders of the
Ansar al-Dine movement, that took over the area and sought to impose a
particular cultural and religious viewpoint by destroying these sites.116 At
the ICC level, Ai-Mahdi became the first defendant to enter a plea of guilty
to the crimes charged, including war crimes for cultural heritage violations,
sending the issue of reparations for these crimes to the ICC for future
determination."7
Subsequently, in August 2017, the ICC issued its reparations decision in
AI-Mabdi. The claimants for reparations were 139 individuals, not including
any international organizations that rendered financial and other assistance
to the community in Timbuktu." 8 In this instance, the ICC went further
and recognized that there were additional impacted communities, notably
the Malian community as a whole and the global community, and that some
form of reparation was required on their behalf as well."9
112. Id.
113. Thyssen-Bornemisza III, 862 F.3d at 973 (Judge Bea wrote the opinion, with Judge Callahan
concurring. Judge Ikuta concurred in all parts except those arguing the 1870 definition survived
its 1950 amendment).
114. See UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT (LAST AMENDED 2010), 17 JULY 1998, ISBN No. 92-9227-227-6, available at: http://
www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a84.html, art. 8(2)(e)(iv) (providing that the definition of war
crimes includes "serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of
an international character, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of
the following acts: (iv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion,
education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where
the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives.").
115. The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al-Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Procedural History, T 1
(Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_05117.PDF.
116. Stephanie Hon, International Criminal Court Trial of Abhoad al-Faqial-Mahdi, COLUM. J.
OF TRANSNAT'L L., http://jtl.columbia.edu/international-criminal-court-trial-of-ahmad-alfaqi-al-mahdi/.
117. See id.
118. AhmadAlFaqiAl-Mahdi,ICC-01/12-01/15, Procedural History, T 5, 52.
119. Id. Order for reparations against Mr Al Mahdi, T 54-55.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

Published by SMU Scholar, 2018

13

The Year in Review, Vol. 52, No. 1 [2018], Art. 29

THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
434

[VOL. 52

THE YEAR IN REVIEW

Importantly for the use of the war crimes statute for cultural heritage
damage and destruction, the ICC crafted a definition that was based on the
ways in that UNESCO conceives of cultural heritage. Specifically, the ICC
stated that, in the context of international war crimes, cultural heritage
includes territory and sites on it, monuments, movable property and tangible
items, and intangible heritage.120 It also recognized that cultural property is
reflective of the abilities of individuals and communities, and that this makes
cultural heritage unique.121 At the same time, the ICC provided that "world
cultural heritage is a most important category. Greater interest vested in an
object by the international community reflects a higher cultural significance
and a higher degree of international attention and concern."122 With this in
mind, it noted that damage to cultural heritage caused irreparable harm to
the identity and collective memory of the community.23
One of the unusual aspects of the Al-Mahdi case was that UNESCO
worked with the local community to rebuild the majority of the destroyed
sites in the interim period between their destruction and the ICC's decision.
AI-Mahdi had attempted to use this as a mitigating factor for the award of
reparations; however the ICC determined that this was not a viable reason
for altering the award. Given the state of the repaired sites, however, the
ICC determined that the appropriate use of a compensatory award was for
the present and future assistance of the community as a whole.124
Another type of reparation in this case involved a public apology. Part of
AI-Mahdi's guilty plea included a public statement of apology for his crimes.
The ICC found that this was a suitable form of reparation and that the
apology should be broadcast widely throughout Mali and made available to

the global community.125
For those bringing individual complaints, the ICC addressed reparations
based on consequential economic losses, taking into account the amount of
each person's financial loss. Consequential economic losses for the
community of Timbuktu as a whole were to reflect the amount of financial
harm caused by the destruction of the cultural heritage sites as a whole.
Further, claims were brought against AI-Mahdi for the moral damages
caused to individuals who had family tombs impacted by the destruction of
the cultural heritage sites as well as by the community as a whole. Individual
reparations were designed to be addressed at the same level of impact
120. Id. Overview, T 15-18.

121. Id. Overview, T 16. (stating that "Cultural items considered as cultural heritage are objects,
monuments and sites that are considered to be testimonies of human creativity and genius. It is

this exceptional quality which warrants their labelling as cultural heritage. Cultural heritage is
important not only in itself, but also in relation to its human dimension. Cultural property also

allows a group to distinguish and identify itself before the world community.").
122. Id. Overview, T 17.
123. Id. Overview, T 22.

124. Ahmad Al Faqi Al-Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Scope of liability, T 122-128.
125. Id. Kinds of harm suffered, types of reparations and modalities,

68-71.
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depending on the actual harms suffered and the community was to be
compensated as a whole.126
In determining the full amount of reparations liability, the ICC examined
the factual situation surrounding the command system for the acts of
destruction and noted that, because there were other parties responsible for
crafting and executing the decision to destroy these sites, it would be
127
inappropriate to place the entire burden on Al-Mahdi.
Arguments regarding the amount of liability to assess against AI-Mahdi
included assertions by his counsel that his declared indigent status should be
a factor in the determination, but the ICC refused to take the indigence
claim into account. In its view, this would reduce the recognition of
damages to the individual and collective victims inappropriately
undermining the importance of cultural heritage losses.128
When setting the awards due, the ICC did take into account the amount
spent by UNESCO on the repaired buildings, but as previously noted,
required that this amount be used for the current and future benefit of the
community.29 The consequential economic losses figure assessed against
AI-Mahdi - 2.12 million Euros - was the result of calculations that were
heavily dependent on determining losses to the community due to losses
from tourism to the cultural heritage sites themselves.30 Determinations for
financial valuation of moral losses were heavily influenced by the
determinations of the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission, and were
ultimately assessed at 23,000 Euros per qualifying claimant.'3' In total, the
assessed reparations against AI-Mahdi amounted to 2.7 million Euros.32
The case has moved to the implementation phase, in that further
determinations regarding the ICC's decision will be made; key among them
is whether there will be funds to cover the costs of the damages assessed. At
the moment, there is a Trust Fund for Victims that exists as part of the ICC
structure and is funded by voluntary contributions from ICC member states
and others, however it is unclear the extent to that it will be able to provide
financial assistance.
Beyond the amount of damages assessed and its ability to be implemented,
the AI-Mahdi reparations decision is an important development in that it
provides an understanding and definition of cultural heritage at the
international criminal law level.

126. Id. para. 52, 59.
127. Id. Scope of liability, T 110.
128. See id. Scope of liability, T 114.
129. Id. Scope of liability, T 116-118.

130. Ahmad Al Faqi Al-Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Scope of liability, T 126-128.
131. Id. Scope of liability, T 131-132.

132. Id. Scope of liability, T 134.
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